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06/20/2023
Delegated Classification
When machine learning is outsourced to a rational agent, conflicts of in...
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02/07/2023
Universally Robust Information Aggregation for Binary Decisions
We study an information aggregation setting in which a decision maker ma...
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11/13/2022
Bayesian Analysis of Linear Contracts
We study a generalization of both the classic single-dimensional mechani...
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09/27/2022
Information Design in the Principal-Agent Problem
We study a variant of the principal-agent problem in which the principal...
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06/17/2022
Strategic Representation
Humans have come to rely on machines for reducing excessive information ...
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05/18/2022
Distributional Robustness: From Pricing to Auctions
Robust mechanism design is a rising alternative to Bayesian mechanism de...
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04/17/2022
Interdependent Public Projects
In the interdependent values (IDV) model introduced by Milgrom and Weber...
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11/18/2021
Multi-Channel Bayesian Persuasion
The celebrated Bayesian persuasion model considers strategic communicati...
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11/17/2021
Contracts with Private Cost per Unit-of-Effort
Economic theory distinguishes between principal-agent settings in which ...
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09/17/2021
Unified Fair Allocation of Goods and Chores via Copies
We consider fair allocation of indivisible items in a model with goods, ...
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07/19/2021
Auctions with Interdependence and SOS: Improved Approximation
Interdependent values make basic auction design tasks – in particular ma...
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05/31/2021
Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency
We study contract design for welfare maximization in the well known "com...
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05/28/2021
Regret-Minimizing Bayesian Persuasion
We study a Bayesian persuasion setting with binary actions (adopt and re...
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02/23/2021
Strategic Classification in the Dark
Strategic classification studies the interaction between a classificatio...
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12/06/2020
Bayesian Persuasion under Ex Ante and Ex Post Constraints
Bayesian persuasion, as introduced by Kamenica and Gentzkow in 2011, is ...
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11/01/2020
Price of Anarchy of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values
We expand the literature on the price of anarchy (PoA) of simultaneous i...
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03/12/2020
Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer
A single seller wishes to sell n items to a single unit-demand buyer. We...
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02/27/2020
The Complexity of Contracts
We initiate the study of computing (near-)optimal contracts in succinctl...
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11/22/2019
Competitive Equilibrium with Generic Budgets: Beyond Additive
We study competitive equilibrium in the canonical Fisher market model, b...
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12/31/2018
Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design
Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, a...
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11/24/2018
Complement-Free Couples Must Communicate: A Hardness Result for Two-Player Combinatorial Auctions
We study the communication complexity of welfare maximization in combina...
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08/10/2018
