A Budget Feasible Peer Graded Mechanism For IoT-Based Crowdsourcing
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We develop and extend a line of recent works on the design of mechanisms for heterogeneous task assignment problem in 'crowdsourcing'. The budgeted market we consider consists of multiple task requesters and multiple IoT devices as task executers; where each task requester is endowed with single distinct task along with the publicly known budget. Also, each IoT device has valuations as the cost for executing the tasks, which is private. Given such scenario, the objective is to select a subset of IoT devices for each task, such that the total payment made is within the allotted quota of the budget while attaining a threshold quality. We assume that the IoT devices have some quality, that is unknown. So, one of our major concerns is to learn the unknown qualities of the IoT devices. For this purpose, we have utilized the concept of plurality voting rule from voting theory. In this paper, we have carefully crafted a truthful mechanism for the problem under investigation that also allows us to have the true information about the quality of the IoT devices. It has been shown that other than truthfulness, our proposed mechanism satisfies several other economic properties such as individual rationality, budget balance, and budget feasibility.
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