Concave Pro-rata Games
share
In this paper, we introduce a family of games called concave pro-rata games. In such a game, players place their assets into a pool, and the pool pays out some concave function of all assets placed into it. Each player then receives a pro-rata share of the payout; i.e., each player receives an amount proportional to how much they placed in the pool. Such games appear in a number of practical scenarios, including as a simplified version of batched decentralized exchanges, such as those proposed by Penumbra. We show that this game has a number of interesting properties, including a symmetric pure equilibrium that is the unique equilibrium of this game, and we prove that its price of anarchy is Ω(n) in the number of players. We also show some numerical results in the iterated setting which suggest that players quickly converge to an equilibrium in iterated play.
READ FULL TEXT