Deceptive Labeling: Hypergames on Graphs for Stealthy Deception
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With the increasing sophistication of attacks on cyber-physical systems, deception has emerged as an effective tool to improve system security and safety by obfuscating information or providing misleading information. In this paper, we present a solution to the deceptive game in which a control agent is to satisfy a Boolean objective specified by a co-safe temporal logic formula in the presence of an adversary. The agent intentionally introduces asymmetric information to create payoff misperception. This is done by masking information about the logical formula satisfied given the outcome of the game. We introduce hypergames on graphs as a model to capture the asymmetrical information with one-sided payoff misperception. We present the solution of such a hypergame for synthesizing stealthy deceptive strategies that exploit adversary's misperception. Specifically, deceptive sure winning and deceptive almost-sure winning strategies are developed by reducing the hypergame to a two-player game and one-player stochastic game with reachability objectives. Finally, an illustrative example is introduced to demonstrate the correctness of theory and proposed algorithms.
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