Drndalo: Lightweight Control Flow Obfuscation Through Minimal Processor/Compiler Co-Design
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Binary analysis is traditionally used in the realm of malware detection. However, the same technique may be employed by an attacker to analyze the original binaries in order to reverse engineer them and extract exploitable weaknesses. When a binary is distributed to end users, it becomes a common remotely exploitable attack point. Code obfuscation is used to hinder reverse engineering of executable programs. In this paper, we focus on securing binary distribution, where attackers gain access to binaries distributed to end devices, in order to reverse engineer them and find potential vulnerabilities. Attackers do not however have means to monitor the execution of said devices. In particular, we focus on the control flow obfuscation — a technique that prevents an attacker from restoring the correct reachability conditions for the basic blocks of a program. By doing so, we thwart attackers in their effort to infer the inputs that cause the program to enter a vulnerable state (e.g., buffer overrun). We propose a compiler extension for obfuscation and a minimal hardware modification for dynamic deobfuscation that takes advantage of a secret key stored in hardware. We evaluate our experiments on the LLVM compiler toolchain and the BRISC-V open source processor. On PARSEC benchmarks, our deobfuscation technique incurs only a 5% runtime overhead. We evaluate the security of Drndalo by training classifiers on pairs of obfuscated and unobfuscated binaries. Our results shine light on the difficulty of producing obfuscated binaries of arbitrary programs in such a way that they are statistically indistinguishable from plain binaries.
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