Exchange of Renewable Energy among Prosumers using Blockchain with Dynamic Pricing

by   Arnob Ghosh, et al.

We consider users which may have renewable energy harvesting devices, or distributed generators. Such users can behave as consumer or producer (hence, we denote them as prosumers) at different time instances. A prosumer may sell the energy to other prosumers in exchange of money. We consider a demand response model, where the price of conventional energy depends on the total demand of all the prosumers at a certain time. A prosumer depending on its own utility has to select the amount of energy it wants to buy either from the grid or from other prosumers, or the amount of excess energy it wants to sell to other prosumers. However, the strategy, and the payoff of a prosumer inherently depends on the strategy of other prosumers as a prosumer can only buy if the other prosumers are willing to sell. We formulate the problem as a coupled constrained game, and seek to obtain the generalized Nash equilibrium. We show that the game is a concave potential game and show that there exists a unique generalized Nash equilibrium. We consider that a platform will set the price for distributed interchange of energy among the prosumers in order to minimize the consumption of the conventional energy. We propose a distributed algorithm where the platform sets a price to each prosumer, and then each prosumer at a certain time only optimizes its own payoff. The prosumer then updates the price depending on the supply and demand for each prosumer. We show that the algorithm converges to an optimal generalized Nash equilibrium. The distributed algorithm also provides an optimal price for the exchange market.


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