Game-theoretic modeling of curtailment rules and network investments with distributed generation

by   Merlinda Andoni, et al.

Renewable energy has achieved high penetration rates in many areas, leading to curtailment, especially if existing network infrastructure is insufficient and energy generated cannot be exported. In this context, Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) face a significant knowledge gap about how to implement curtailment rules that achieve desired operational objectives, but at the same time minimise disruption and economic losses for renewable generators. In this work, we study the properties of several curtailment rules widely used in UK renewable energy projects, and their effect on the viability of renewable generation investment. Moreover, we propose a new curtailment rule which guarantees fair allocation of curtailment amongst all generators with minimal disruption. Another key knowledge gap faced by DNOs is how to incentivise private network upgrades, especially in settings where several generators can use the same line against the payment of a transmission fee. In this work, we provide a solution to this problem by using tools from algorithmic game theory. Specifically, this setting can be modelled as a Stackelberg game between the private transmission line investor and local renewable generators, who are required to pay a transmission fee to access the line. We provide a method for computing the empirical equilibrium of this game, using a model that captures the stochastic nature of renewable energy generation and demand. Finally, we use the practical setting of a grid reinforcement project from the UK and a large dataset of wind speed measurements and demand to validate our model. We show that charging a transmission fee as a proportion of the feed-in tariff price between 15 and achieve desirable distribution of the profit.


page 1

page 2

page 3

page 4


Gibbs sampling for game-theoretic modeling of private network upgrades with distributed generation

Renewable energy is increasingly being curtailed, due to oversupply or n...

Exchange of Renewable Energy among Prosumers using Blockchain with Dynamic Pricing

We consider users which may have renewable energy harvesting devices, or...

Privacy Preserving and Collusion Resistant Energy Sharing

Energy has been increasingly generated or collected by different entitie...

A Dynamic Game Approach for Demand-Side Management: Scheduling Energy Storage with Forecasting Errors

Smart metering infrastructure allows for two-way communication and power...

Mechanism Design for Demand Management in Energy Communities

We consider a demand management problem of an energy community, in which...

Managing Price Uncertainty in Prosumer-Centric Energy Trading: A Prospect-Theoretic Stackelberg Game Approach

In this paper, the problem of energy trading between smart grid prosumer...

A Kinetic Monte Carlo Approach for Simulating Cascading Transmission Line Failure

In this work, cascading transmission line failures are studied through a...

Please sign up or login with your details

Forgot password? Click here to reset