Incentives to Form Larger Coalitions when Players Have the Power to Choose
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We study a cooperative game setting where the grand coalition may change since the initial players are willing to invite their neighbours and also want to incentivize them to invite more players to join. We focus on the monotone games, i.e., adding more players to the grand coalition is not harmful. We model the invitation relationship as a forest since we require that each player can only accept the invitation at most once. Our goal is to design a solution mechanism to this new cooperative game setting. In this paper, we characterize the weighted permission Shapley value (inspired by permission structure and the weighted Shapley value), which is diffusion incentive compatible, i.e., all players are incentivized to invite their neighbours to join the coalition. Our solution offers the very first attempt to incentivize players to invite more players to form a larger coalition via their private connections, which has many potential applications in other real-world.
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