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06/27/2023
The Distortion of Binomial Voting Defies Expectation
In computational social choice, the distortion of a voting rule quantifi...
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02/11/2023
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms
A powerful feature in mechanism design is the ability to irrevocably com...
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12/16/2022
On the Complexities of Understanding Matching Mechanisms
We study various novel complexity measures for two-sided matching mechan...
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09/27/2022
Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions
A menu description defines a mechanism to player i in two steps. Step (1...
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03/05/2021
Revenue Maximization for Buyers with Outside Options
We study mechanisms for selling a single item when buyers have private v...
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03/12/2020
Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer
A single seller wishes to sell n items to a single unit-demand buyer. We...
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02/18/2020
The Complexity of Interactively Learning a Stable Matching by Trial and Error
In a stable matching setting, we consider a query model that allows for ...
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06/25/2019
A Compact, Logical Approach to Large-Market Analysis
In game theory, we often use infinite models to represent "limit" settin...
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05/01/2019
Matching for the Israeli "Mechinot" Gap-Year Programs: Handling Rich Diversity Requirements
We describe our experience with designing and running a matching market ...
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03/15/2019
Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Welfare Maximization in Two-Sided Markets
We consider the problem of welfare maximization in two-sided markets usi...
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10/15/2018
Playing on a Level Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism with a Coarse Priority Structure
Who gains and who loses from a manipulable school choice mechanism? We e...
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08/07/2018
The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization
We consider the sample complexity of revenue maximization for multiple b...
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02/22/2018
Are Two (Samples) Really Better Than One? On the Non-Asymptotic Performance of Empirical Revenue Maximization
The literature on "mechanism design from samples," which has flourished ...
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02/22/2018
The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Trade
The seminal impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) sta...
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08/29/2017
