EZClone: Improving DNN Model Extraction Attack via Shape Distillation from GPU Execution Profiles
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Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have become ubiquitous due to their performance on prediction and classification problems. However, they face a variety of threats as their usage spreads. Model extraction attacks, which steal DNNs, endanger intellectual property, data privacy, and security. Previous research has shown that system-level side-channels can be used to leak the architecture of a victim DNN, exacerbating these risks. We propose two DNN architecture extraction techniques catering to various threat models. The first technique uses a malicious, dynamically linked version of PyTorch to expose a victim DNN architecture through the PyTorch profiler. The second, called EZClone, exploits aggregate (rather than time-series) GPU profiles as a side-channel to predict DNN architecture, employing a simple approach and assuming little adversary capability as compared to previous work. We investigate the effectiveness of EZClone when minimizing the complexity of the attack, when applied to pruned models, and when applied across GPUs. We find that EZClone correctly predicts DNN architectures for the entire set of PyTorch vision architectures with 100 accuracy. No other work has shown this degree of architecture prediction accuracy with the same adversarial constraints or using aggregate side-channel information. Prior work has shown that, once a DNN has been successfully cloned, further attacks such as model evasion or model inversion can be accelerated significantly.
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