Optimal Auction Design for the Gradual Procurement of Strategic Service Provider Agents
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We consider an outsourcing problem where a software agent procures multiple services from providers with uncertain reliabilities to complete a computational task before a strict deadline. The service consumer requires a procurement strategy that achieves the optimal balance between success probability and invocation cost. However, the service providers are self-interested and may misrepresent their private cost information if it benefits them. For such settings, we design a novel procurement auction that provides the consumer with the highest possible revenue, while giving sufficient incentives to providers to tell the truth about their costs. This auction creates a contingent plan for gradual service procurement that suggests recruiting a new provider only when the success probability of the already hired providers drops below a time-dependent threshold. To make this auction incentive compatible, we propose a novel weighted threshold payment scheme which pays the minimum among all truthful mechanisms. Using the weighted payment scheme, we also design a low-complexity near-optimal auction that reduces the computational complexity of the optimal mechanism by 99 marginal performance loss (less than 1 strength of our proposed auctions through both game theoretical and numerical analysis. The experiment results confirm that the proposed auctions exhibit 59 improvement in performance over the current state-of-the-art, by increasing success probability up to 79
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