Optimal Sharing and and Fair Cost Allocation of Community Energy Storage
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This paper studies an optimal energy storage (ES) sharing model which is cooperatively invested by multiple buildings to harness on-site renewable utilization and grid price arbitrage. We jointly consider the ES sizing, operation and cost allocation via a coalition game formulation. Particularly, we study the fair ex-post cost allocation of ES sharing which has not been well addressed in the literature. To overcome the computation burden caused by the implicit characteristic function (takes exponential time), we develop a fair cost allocation based on nucleolus by employing a constraint generation technique. We demonstrate the fairness and computational efficiency of the method through case studies. The numeric results imply the proposed method outperforms Shapley approach and proportional method in computational efficiency and fairness, respectively. Notably, only a small fraction of characteristic function (less than 1 cost allocation versus the entire information required by Shapley approach. With the proposed cost allocation, we demonstrate the enhanced social benefits of the ES sharing model over individual ES (IES) model. We show the proposed ES sharing model can provide higher cost reduction to each committed building than the IES model, i.e., 8.5 considerably improved (about 1.83 times) over the IES model
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