PTAuth: Temporal Memory Safety via Robust Points-to Authentication
share
Temporal memory corruptions are commonly exploited software vulnerabilities that can lead to powerful attacks. Despite significant progress made by decades of research on mitigation techniques, existing countermeasures fall short due to either limited coverage or overly high overhead. Furthermore, they require external mechanisms (e.g., spatial memory safety) to protect their metadata. Otherwise, their protection can be bypassed or disabled. To address these limitations, we present robust points-to authentication, a novel runtime scheme for detecting all kinds of temporal memory corruptions. We built a prototype system, called PTAuth, that realizes this scheme on ARM architectures. PTAuth contains a customized compiler for code analysis and instrumentation and a runtime library for performing the points-to authentication as a protected program runs. PTAuth leverages the Pointer Authentication Code (PAC) feature provided by the latest ARM CPUs, which serves as a simple hardware-based encryption primitive. PTAuth uses minimal in-memory metadata and protects its metadata without requiring spatial memory safety. We report our evaluation of PTAuth in terms of security, robustness and performance using 150 vulnerable programs from Juliet test suite and the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks. PTAuth detects all temporal memory corruptions from all 3 categories, generates zero false alerts, and slows down program execution by 26.0 to be lower on hardware with PAC support).
READ FULL TEXT