Secure and Efficient Compressed Sensing Based Encryption With Sparse Matrices
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In this paper, we study the security of a compressed sensing (CS) based cryptosystem called a sparse one-time sensing (S-OTS) cryptosystem, which encrypts each plaintext with a sparse measurement matrix. To generate the secret matrix and renew it at each encryption, a bipolar keystream and a random permutation pattern are employed as cryptographic primitives, which are obtained by a keystream generator of stream ciphers. With a small number of nonzero elements in the measurement matrix, the S-OTS cryptosystem achieves an efficient CS encryption process in terms of data storage and computational cost. For security analysis, we show that the S-OTS cryptosystem can be computationally secure against ciphertext only attacks (COA) in terms of the indistinguishability, as long as each plaintext has constant energy. Also, we consider a chosen plaintext attack (CPA) against the S-OTS cryptosystem, which consists of two stages of keystream and key recovery attacks. Then, we show that it can achieve the security against the CPA of keystream recovery with overwhelmingly high probability, as an adversary needs to distinguish a prohibitively large number of candidate keystreams. Finally, we conduct an information-theoretic analysis to demonstrate that the S-OTS cryptosystem has sufficient resistance against the CPA of key recovery by guaranteeing the extremely low probability of success. In conclusion, the S-OTS cryptosystem can be indistinguishable and secure against a CPA, while providing efficiency in CS encryption.
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