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05/28/2022
Fine-Grained Buy-Many Mechanisms Are Not Much Better Than Bundling
Multi-item optimal mechanisms are known to be extremely complex, often o...
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05/25/2022
On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with k heterogeneous items for s...
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02/15/2020
Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents
We consider revenue-optimal mechanism design in the interdimensional set...
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06/07/2019
Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules: On Large Manipulating Sets and Cover-Consistence
We consider the manipulability of tournament rules, in which n teams pla...
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05/13/2019
Approximation Schemes for a Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with n items facing a single buy...
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11/29/2018
Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values
Consider a seller with m heterogeneous items for sale to a single additi...
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11/06/2017
